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COMMENT
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY FOR NONDISCLOSURE OF
POST-CERTIFICATION DISCOVERY OF ERROR
The last thirty-five years have witnessed a steady and heated
debate with respect to the proper limits of accountants' liabilities for
damages which result from their certified audits. This controversy,
which began in the wake of the landmark pronouncements in Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche,' took on a new importance with the extensive
financial reporting requirements instituted a few years later by the
Securities Acts.2 The role of accountants' services has grown with
the development of an economic structure where, by means of the
corporate device and credit transactions, industrial management is
separated from the sources of funds.
Public accounting . . . bridges the gap between debtor and
creditor and the purchaser and seller of securities. The prin-
cipal function of the public accountant is to prepare state-
ments diagnosing his clients' financial status, the client in
turn using the statement as a passport for obtaining credit
and selling securities. Because accounting requires specialized
knowledge, millions of dollars are expended annually in re-
liance upon the accountants' diagnosis.'
The question of accountants' duties relative to certification has
arisen in a new setting in the recent case of Fischer v. Kletz.4 In that
case, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM) had audited and certified
the 1963 financial statements of Yale Express Systems, Inc., which
were submitted to Yale stockholders and the SEC in April and June
of 1964, respectively 5 After this certification was completed, PMM
undertook "special studies" of Yale's income and expenses, which
studies were to be used for internal purposes, rather than to serve as
representations to the public. Figures uncovered in these studies
clearly showed that the earlier certified statements had misstated Yale's
financial position by a substantial, but indeterminate amount. Despite
1255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1964) ; Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964); Investment Co. Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§80a-1-51 (1964).
3 Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer for
Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. Rtv. 371.
4266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
5 Certification of financial statements and submission to the SEC is required by
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2) (1964).
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this discovery, made sometime in 1964, the errors were not disclosed
by PMM either to management, the New York Stock Exchange (on
which the securities were traded) or the public, until May, 1965. Plain-
tiffs,' who had purchased Yale securities in reliance on the uncorrected
1963 statements after PMM's discovery of error, sought to recover re-
sulting losses, claiming common law deceit and violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.7 Thus, the breach of duty
alleged did not involve negligence or a plot to deceive in the original
mistaken certification, but rather nondisclosure of an error discovered
after the certification had become effective. The court's opinion, deny-
ing a motion to dismiss, reserved resolution of the issues raised for
full development of the facts at trial.
The definition of accountants' duties upon discovery of error in
certified statements should be made by considering the various in-
terests involved. Those who have been damaged by reliance on false
information which could have been corrected will seek compensation
for their loss. The accountant who discovers the error has an interest
in maintaining good relations with his client, and will be hesitant to
make any disclosure which would jeopardize this relationship. The
investing public's interest in the prompt restoration of accuracy in
financial reports may be thought to conflict with the interests of stock-
holders in avoiding the loss of stock marketability that would result
from speculative overreaction to news of the error.
It is likely that the dilemma of post-certification discovery of
error will recur with greater frequency as dependence on accounting
sources increases. This Comment therefore will deal with the broad
problems inherent in this factual setting, by examining the two inde-
pendently developed theories of liability suggested in Fischer: common
law deceit and violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. This discussion will be followed by an exploration of the policy
problems inherent in the imposition of such liability.
COMMON LAW LIABILITY
The accountant who undertakes to audit financial statements places
upon himself distinct duties of care based independently on contract
GThe plaintiffs, who sued as a class, consisted of purchasers of Yale stock and
debentures. The question of whether a class action was appropriate was decided in
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Defendant's motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, to stay proceedings pending investigation by the ICC was denied
in Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Kaplan, Continuing
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rides of Civil Pro-
cedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356 (1967); Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based
Upon Securities Frauds Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 FORDHAm L.
REv. 295 (1966).
7 Plaintiffs also alleged violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15
U.S.C. §78r (1964). The questions presented by that allegation, which involve
factual considerations not relevant here, are treated in 266 F. Supp. at 189. For a
discussion of whether the existence of a remedy under § 18 for misleading certified
statements precludes application of § 10(b) to the present situation, see note 30 infra.
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and tort.' The contractual duty extends only to the client who is party
to the contract of employment and to third parties for whose benefit
the contract was made.' The tort duties extend to a potentially broader
class of people and have been the subject of the controversy over
accountants' liabilities to third parties for improper audit.
The principle that performance of a private contract can give rise
to duties in tort 10 was first tested with respect to auditing contracts in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche," where a corporation sued to recover the
loss on a loan made in reliance on inaccurate financial statements
certified by the defendant. After holding that the obligations of the
auditing contract did not extend to the plaintiff corporation because
it was not the intended beneficiary of the contract,'" Justice Cardozo
ruled that tort recovery could be permitted only if defendant's misrepre-
sentation amounted to fraud, rather than mere negligence.'3  Noting
the element of physical danger in previous cases which had recognized
tort duties in the performance of contracts, the opinion suggests that
such protection is less necessary where the duty involves words and
thoughts rather than physical forces.' 4 A more basic concern was
fear that expanded accountants' liabilities would spell financial ruin for
the profession:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder
. . . may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist
in the implication of a duty that exposes [sic] to these
consequences.' 5
It may be questioned whether the Ultramares rule, denying re-
recovery by third parties for negligence in financial reporting, is appli-
8 UItramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
9Id.
1OThis principle was an innovation of the 19th century. See Thomas v. Win-
chester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Prior to this development, recovery by third parties for
injuries from negligent performance of contracts generally was rejected because of
lack of contractual privity. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842). This restriction was first lifted in cases such as McPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), permitting tort recovery by third
parties where the defendant's breach created a danger of physical injury. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Winchester, supra; Heaven v. Pender, 10 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
11255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
12 The court distinguished Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922),
which permitted a buyer of beans to recover against the weigher for negligently per-
forming a weighing commissioned by the seller. Glanzer, in which reliance by the
buyer was the "end and aim . . . of the transaction," was an extension of the third-
party beneficiary contract principles first set out in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268
(1859), whereas in Ultrainares, "No one would be likely to urge that there was a
contractual relation, or even one approaching it. . . ." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
255 N.Y. 170, 182-83, 174 N.E. 441, 445-46 (1931).
13 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
14Id. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
15 Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
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cable to the present problem. The reference in that decision to liability
for a "thoughtless slip or blunder" seems to indicate a concern for the
especially complex work of the auditor, in which the smallest mistake
in calculation can lead to gross misrepresentations in certified state-
ments. Appropriate as that concern may have been in Ultramares,
it would have little relevance to the case of nondisclosure of discovered
error, where the accountant's decision not to report his error in no
way rested on "slips" in calculation.
There are, however, other elements in the Ultramcres opinion
which suggest that its intended scope does include this case. Despite
the reference to the "thoughtless slip or blunder," Justice Cardozo
makes no explicit suggestion that his rationale is in any way limited
to cases of error in calculation. The factor which stands out as most
essential to the decision is the threat of astronomical liabilities, 6 which
is equally present in improper certification cases regardless of the
source of the error, and which may be as relevant to third party re-
coveries against negligent professionals in fields other than accounting.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Judge Cardozo sees his fraud-
negligence dichotomy as relevant far beyond the facts of Ultramares,
and, indeed, to "many callings other than an auditor's." '7
Developments in professional liability insurance since the Ultra-
mares decision throw the "financial ruin" rationale open to doubt.'
While the decision in Ultrainares, on its facts, still may be justified
in light of the extraordinary risk factor in the accounting function in-
volved there, it is now questionable whether Justice Cardozo's broad
conception of the rule should allow its extension to the ordinary-risk
situation of an accountant's nondisclosure of discovered error. Thus,
it is arguable that liability of the accountant in the present situation
should be determined according to a simple negligence standard.
The imposition of liability, however, does not depend on rejection
of the fraud-negligence dichotomy, since the accountant's nondisclosure
of post-certification discovery of error contains the elements of common
law fraud (deceit) as well as negligence. Although, generally nondis-
closure is not actionable as deceit,'9 there are exceptions to this rule.
Where defendant reveals what to his knowledge is only a half truth,
nondisclosure of the full information is actionable as deceit,"0 and thus
supports recovery by third parties.2 The discovery that a representa-
16 It has been so recognized by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Levitin,
Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J.
436, 446 (1964) ; Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for
Negligence, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 588 (1967).
17 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
'8 See text accompanying notes 54-61 infra.
19 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK 0F THE LAW OF TORTS, § 101, at 701 (3d ed. 1964).
20 Id. at 711.
21 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938) (account-
ant liable for failure to include material information pertaining to scope of audit).
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tion, which may have been true and complete when made, has proven
false or incomplete at a later time, gives rise to a duty to reveal that
discovery to anyone known to be relying on the original statement.2
Implicit in this principle is the assumption, basic to accountants'
liability in the present situation, that a statement of fact made at a
given point in time, which is intended to be relied on for some period
in the future, is, in effect, a continuing representation for the entire
period in which reliance is expected. Thus, when it is discovered
during the period of continuing reliance that the original statement was
incorrect, the representor commits a fraud by allowing the now con-
scious misrepresentation to continue in effect.
The fact that many of the cases allowing recovery for non-
disclosure on the basis of deceit were cases in which the defendant
stood to benefit financially from his deception raises the question of
whether this factor is a prerequisite to liability. The presence of the
element of personal enrichment in these cases should not be surprising,
since the conception of fraud is generally associated with an intent to
turn another's misinformation to one's own benefit. However, the
suggestion that defendant's potential for gain is a necessary element of
deceit liability in nondisclosure cases has been rejected when raised.
In Goldsmith v. Koopman,23 where the deceit consisted of nondis-
closure of information qualifying a representation made to plaintiffs,
the court repudiated the gain prerequisite: "The complainants have
been damaged to their hurt, and the defendant Koopman was a factor
therein. That is the gravamen of the charge; not that defendant
Koopman has gained, but that complainants have lost by his fault." 24
In a case much closer to the present problem, State Street Trust Co.
v. Ernst,25 an accountant's nondisclosure was held to constitute fraud,
despite the lack of any evidence of a motive to benefit. Where the
accountant has no intention to defraud for his own gain, "heedlessness
and reckless disregard of consequence may take the place of deliberate
intention." 26 Thus, while there has been no case dealing directly with
22W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 101, at 711. This principle has been applied
where a buyer or seller of property failed to disclose to the other party changes
in the value of the property, subsequent to negotiation, but prior to sale, Hush v.
Reaugh, 23 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ill. 1938); Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir.
1893) ; where a seller of equipment learned, subsequent to sale, but prior to full
delivery, that the equipment was defective, Strand v. Librascope, 197 F. Supp. 743
(E.D. Mich. 1961); where a representation of patentability by an inventor's agent
proved incorrect while plaintiff was making payments to finance exploitation of the
invention, Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1937); and in other
analagous situations. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 269 App. Div. 405, 56 N.Y.S.2d
36 (1945); cf. Piedmont & Arlinton Life Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 92 U.S. 377 (1875);
Stevens v. Marco, 147 Cal. App. 2d 357, 305 P.2d 669 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
2 140 F. 616 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905).
24 Id. at 621.
25 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938). See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
26278 N.Y. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 419; cf., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v.
Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927); Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill. 469, 12 N.E. 247 (1887);
Sorenson v. Gardner, 215 Ore. 255, 334 P.2d 471 (1959) ; Boord v. Kaylor, 114 Ore.
62, 234 P. 263 (1925).
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the present situation of nondisclosure of subsequently discovered error
by a person with nothing to gain financially from the nondisclosure,
an accountant's failure to reveal such error falls within the scope of
common law deceit as defined in Ultramares, and hence provides a
basis for liability to third parties who rely to their detriment on the
mistaken financial statements.
The foregoing analysis is a partial consideration of the merits
of recognizing a common law duty of accountants to disclose post-
certification discovery of error to third parties. It suggests merely
that there is a foundation for such liability in the common law.
Whether recognition of such a duty is wise as a matter of policy will
be considered after discussion of the statutory basis for liability.
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5
A second basis for assessing liability may be contained in section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act," and rule 10b-5 thereunder,28
which proscribe deception and fraud-by misrepresentation, omission
or other act or scheme-in connection with securities transactions.
Courts usually have implied a civil remedy for persons damaged by
violation of these provisions.' Thus, if nondisclosure of the discovery
27 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964) :
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or, of
any facility of any national securities exchange- .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
2817 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1967):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 'mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
M Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ; Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Errion v. Connell, 236
F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3rd Cir.
1956) ; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Corp., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ; cf. J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962) ;
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F._d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Estate
Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527
(10th Cir. 1962). Contra, Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., [1966-7
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L." RE. 1191,996 (D. Ill. 1967). The appropriate-
ness of any retrospective federal remedy for the victim of a violation of rule 10b-5
has been subject to considerable controversy. For discussion of this broader problem;
see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 7& HARv. L. REv. 1146
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of error is held to be deception within the scope of the rule, recovery
in the present situation could be awarded to those injured by the un-
corrected financial statements "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." " The limitation of rule lOb-5 to deception in con-
nection with securities transactions makes a remedy under it unavail-
able to those injured by lending money to the corporation, or by
entering into a transaction involving no purchase or sale of securities.31
Historically, courts have construed rule 10b-5 to cover a wide
range of situations. The concept of fraud which has emerged from
this liberality is at least as broad as the common law doctrine which
1170 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Review of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963); Joseph, Civil Liability under Rule lOb-5-
A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a
Federal Law of Corporations by Implication through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
185 (1964).
30 It should be noted that the existence of § 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r (1964), dealing specifically with misleading statements in documents filed with
the SEC, does not preclude recovery under rule lOb-5. Section 18 itself is inapplicable
to nondisclosure of after-acquired information. Included in the provision are requisites
that the original document be a willful misstatement when filed, and that it be shown
that plaintiff bought or sold "at a price which was affected by such statemenV-an
impossible burden. Further, the scope of § 18's effectiveness is substantially curtailed
by the short, one year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1964). The
narrowness of these provisions raises doubts as to whether the section could have
been intended as the sole restriction in the Exchange Act on misstatements in docu-
ments filed with the Commission. The Exchange Act is not a coordinated, section
by section approach to the separate problems which plagued the securities markets.
Rather, it "contains a miscellaneous collection of provisions involving securities regu-
lation . . . ." R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 564
(3d ed. 1958). Although various sections of the Act may have differences in cover-
age or phraseology, they obviously can overlap. 3 L. Loss, SEcUaRIIEs REGULATION
1428-29 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. And § 10(b) is one of those
sections which most clearly extends to problems partially dealt with elsewhere.
Indeed, the section has been held to support a fraud action based on misstatements in
documents filed with the SEC. Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Pa. 1964). The question of liability under § 10(b) therefore can be dealt with
solely in terms of interpretation of that section, with no concern for preemption of
liability by § 18.
31 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied
343 U.S. 956 (1952), held that only purchasers or sellers of securities could recover
under rule lob-5. The declaration has had considerable impact: ". . . in order to
limit recoverable damages to losses closely connected with securities trading, courts
have universally required that the plaintiff's injury result from his purchase or sale
of securities." Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) au Rule 10b-5: A Sug-
gestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE LJ. 658, 661 (1965).
Some courts have gone beyond this strict limitation. E.g., Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967) and Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) (both holding stockholder, who will be forced
to sell his stock because of a short-form merger, is allowed to sue for damages under
rule lOb-5); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 191,953 (N.D.
Ohio May 18, 1967) (corporation, neither purchaser nor seller, is allowed to bring
an action to enjoin consummation of fraudulent tender offer under rule lOb-5);
Stockwell v. Reynolds, 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding liability where
the only securities transaction was a sale made at a loss after the damage from
restraint from selling because of misstatement was already done) ; M. L. Lee & Co, v.
American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (finding
liability where there was no actual purchase or sale).
The conflict over the Birnbaum limitation of liability to suits only by buyers or
sellers is discussed in Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule lOb-5: An Injunction
for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 618, 620-25 (1967).
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it complements.82 The language of the rule indicates that a broad
definition of fraud was contemplated. For example, 10b-5 explicitly
includes omissions as well as active representations," and extends to
acts that would "operate as a fraud," " rather than merely to acts
which are technically within the common law definition. Nonetheless,
the remedy has not yet been applied against a disinterested accountant
who fails to disclose his post-certification discovery of error. Imposi-
tion of liability in the above situation must be considered in light of
the legitimate concerns that the rule may impose astronomical liabilities
on an indeterminate class of defendants, " and become the basis for a
new, all encompassing "federal corporation law." "
The fear that the risk of unlimited liability will discourage per-
formance of vital economic functions has led to a search for means
of restricting application of rule 10b-5.37  One limiting principle, con-
ceivably implicit in the development of the remedy thus far, is that an
action will lie only against those defendants who stood to benefit from
their deception. Such a rule would allow the anti-fraud provisions to
ensnare only those offenders whose position in the transaction suggests
improper motives, while leaving the disinterested reporter free from
fear that his "thoughtless slip," with no intention to benefit himself,
32 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) ; List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp.
321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); 3 Loss 1430-44.
33 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (b) (1967).
3417 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(c) (1967) (emphasis added).
S5 Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 CoLUm. L. REV. 1361 (1965); Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L.
REv. 627 (1963); Note, Civil Liability, supra note 31, at 658.
3 6 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952) ; Ruder, supra note 35.
37 The search for a way to limit the extent of potential liability without curtailing
the effectiveness of the rule in controlling deception and manipulation in securities
transactions has produced a wide range of possible solutions. The early attempt to
limit recovery to those in privity, Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), proved unsatisfactory. See Freed v. Szabo Food Serv.,
Inc., [1961-4 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Brown v. Bullock, 194
F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co.,
187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1962) ; Note, Civil Liability, supra note 31, at 658, 663-65, and authorities cited therein.
For an earlier discussion of the prospects for the privity doctrine, see 3 Loss 1767.
Although reliance by the plaintiff has been held necessary to recovery, it has been
liberally construed, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463-64 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and has been subject to vigorous criticism as a
means of limiting liability. Painter, supra note 35, at 1366-71. In addition, some
narrowing of duties has been achieved by applying a conservative definition to
"materiality." See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Finally, it has been suggested that civil liability for some cases that fall within
the rule's scope give way to other disciplinary action by the SEC. Painter, supra note
35, at 1361. To the extent that compensation of those damaged is deemed central to the
Exchange Act's scheme of regulation, however, imposition of liability cannot be
replaced by SEC disciplinary action. Thus the legitimate question of how to limit
liability without thwarting the purpose of the Exchange Act remains,
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will ruin him financially. The attractiveness of this limitation has been
recognized in several recent cases.
In Cochran v. Channing Corp., the court suggested that "it is
the use of the inside information that gives rise to a violation of
rule lOb-5." " Further, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Judge
Bonsal declared:
In the absence of a showing that the purpose of the .
press release was to affect the market price of TGS stock
to the advantage of TGS or its insiders, the issuance of the
press release did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b)
or Rule lOb-5. .. .39
Although these statements indicate that courts have been re-
luctant to impose liability on defendants whose actions were not
prompted by selfish motives, recovery has not yet turned on the issue
of defendant's standing to benefit. The statement in Cochran was
made in an opinion which found liability, and hence was extraneous to
the decision." In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the absence of gain was only
one reason why the court refused to find liability for a press release
issued to combat rumors of a valuable mineral discovery by defendant
corporation. The court also found that the release was not intended
to, and did not in fact, produce unusual market action,41 and that no
demonstration had been made that the release was false or deceptive.42
Thus, the court's suggestion that an intention to benefit either defendant
or an insider is necessary to establish liability under rule lOb-5 was
made in a setting where the defendant was not only devoid of selfish
motives, but did not make any misrepresentation at all. As such, its
force is open to doubt.
Indeed, there have been cases where recovery has been permitted
in the absence-of personal gain by the defendant. As the court noted
in Fischer v. Kletz, defendants who have been held liable under the
rule have included not only insiders, broker-dealers and corporations
whose stock is purchased or sold, but also those who aid and abet or
conspire with such parties.4 These cases indicate that the concern has
been not so much with penalizing only those who stood to gain by
misleading the public, as with punishing those whose misrepre-
sentation or failure to disclose was conscious, rather than accidental.44
38211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (emphasis added).
39258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis added).
4 o See Fleischer, supra note 29, at 1157 n.51.
41258 F. Supp. at 294.
42 Id. at 294-96.
43 266 F. Supp. at 190.
4 4 See Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); SEC v. Timetrust,
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461 (1946); 3
Loss 1476.
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Where there is a conspiracy or where defendant acts to aid and abet
another, such consciousness is evident. When defendant misleads in
such a way that he stands to gain from his victim's ignorance, con-
sciousness and intent are presumed.
A rule limiting liability to conscious misrepresentations seems ideal
in its application to the present problem. An accountant who certifies
incorrect financial statements would be free, under this standard, from
fear of 10b-5 liability so long as his only contribution to the mistake
was an unintentional error or miscalculation in the preparation of
statements. However, if and when he becomes aware of his mistake
and consciously fails to make a disclosure of the error, damages should
be assessed. Since the defendant whose breach comes within such
limits would be fully aware of the deception involved, he hardly could
protest his innocence."
This reading of the statute is consistent with the legislative history
of the Exchange Act. Application of the anti-fraud provisions to
those who stand to benefit from their deception serves a major purpose
of the Act by curtailing self-serving schemes to milk investors.4" How-
ever, Congress' concern in 1934 was not limited to deterring such
selfish exploitation. The Act also was designed to accomplish the
more encompassing function of insuring market stability by restoring
investor confidence. 7 Effectuation of this goal only can be achieved
by safeguarding investment information against conscious deception,
as well as intentional fraud.
A second concern which has been voiced in considering extensions
of rule 10b-5 is that liberal construction will transform the rule from
a securities market regulation into a basis for a new "federal cor-
poration law." 's This fear received its first, and most well known
45 The accountant who fails to disclose his post-certification discovery of error
might well come within the rule even if the "standing to benefit" limitation were to
prevail. The nondisclosure will often be caused by a combination of desire to avoid
the adverse publicity which might be stimulated by reports of error, and an intention
to please his client in order to assure continuance of the account. While such motives
are slightly different than an intent to enrich oneself directly by buying or selling
stock at an unfair advantage, they nonetheless provide a factor of gain and it is difficult
to see a real basis for distinguishing them from other selfish intentions. It also should
be noted that, while standing to benefit is not an across the board prerequisite to
lOb-5 liability, it may be quite relevant in certain circumstances. Thus, where the
alleged deception involved mere nondisclosure and no actual misstatement, the failure
to report news may be attributed to concern for the effects disclosure would have
on the corporation. The weight given to such a motive in determining liability under
rule lOb-5 rightly should depend upon the defendant's standing to benefit from his
silence.
46 This concern is amply reflected in the report of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, where there is a full review of methods by which channels
of information and the pricing mechanisms of the securities markets could be made to
serve illegitimate personal interests. 78 CONG. REc. 7704 (April 30, 1934).
471d. at 7702-03.
48 This concern is based on the numerous applications of rule lOb-5 in areas
unaffected by the federal interest in national securities markets. Allowing recovery
where the transaction in question was betveen two stockholders in a close-corporation,
as in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), extends
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expression in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., where Judge Augustus
Hand declared that "Section 10(b) . . . was directed solely at the
type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities rather than fraudulent mismanagement
of corporate affairs . . . " The attempt in Birnbaum to remove
corporate management problems from the reach of 10b-5 reflects "a
reluctance of federal courts to preempt areas of traditional state law
concern." 5" While this general principle has had wide judicial ac-
ceptance, 5 it has undergone some modification. Thus, in Pettit v.
American Stock Exchange, the court recognized that prevention of
deception in national securities markets and the adjudication of internal
mismanagement decisions necessarily overlap, and therefore redefined
federal jurisdiction to exclude only cases where the purchase or sale of
securities is merely "incidental to a major mismanagement issue." 52
The present case of failure to disclose post-certification discovery of
error is certainly not excluded by this standard. Courts have sug-
gested that, in order for a deception to be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," it must have been intended to affect
such purchase or sale.53  Clearly, this connection with securities trans-
actions is present in the case of financial statements compiled and
audited for submission to the SEC. The purpose of filing such state-
ments is to provide information upon which rational investment de-
cisions can be made. Thus, while manipulation of the market may not
be intended, market reliance certainly is. The importance of accuracy
in certified financial statements to the information flow in national
the rule to private frauds. Allowing recovery where the fraud relates to the value
of consideration for securities, rather than the value of the securities themselves,
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), goes beyond the solution of
securities market fraud problems: "The [Exchange Act] is aimed at frauds grow-
ing out of the very complexity of securities transactions, and the fact that the
casual investor is in a poor position to ascertain the truth of representations made
concerning securities. Such disabilities do not exist in the case of most forms of
consideration given for securities." Comment, Rule X-lOb-5: An Unlikely Basis
for Expanding Jurisdiction, 9 STAN. L. REv. 589, 596 (1957). This same complaint
applies where recovery is based on fraudulent nonpayment of the agreed price of
securities. A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). It can be
further argued that allowing recovery by a corporation which has been defrauded in
the issuance of its own stock, Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961), also reaches beyond the securities
markets. See Comment, Rule X-lOb-5 Protection Extended to Issuing Corporation,
13 STAN. L. REv. 378 (1961).
49 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
50 See Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a
Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 618, 621 (1967).
51 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Comment, supra
note 50, at 621 and sources cited therein.
62217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
53 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Heit
v. Weitzen, [1964-6 Transfer Binder] CCH FEa. SEC. L. RE'. 91,701 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-4 Transfer Binder] CCH FMn. SEC.
L. RE'. 1 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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securities markets provides the federal interest necessary for application
of rule lOb-5 to accountants' nondisclosure of post-certification dis-
covery of error.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LIABILITY
The fact that there exists a basis for imposing liability does not
speak to the question of how well such a solution will resolve the
problems created by an accountant's post-certification discovery of error.
The most apparent benefits of a damage remedy for nondisclosure
include compensation to those injured in reliance on the uncorrected
statements, and an incentive toward prompt disclosure of the error.
In addition to these more obvious features, however, there are some
important problems inherent in the imposition of liability for non-
disclosure. This section will consider whether these dangers outweigh
the significant advantages gained by permitting recovery.
Fears of Ruinous Liability
The most widely voiced criticism of an expansion of accountants'
liability is that the added financial burden would be ruinous to the
profession. In a recent article, a senior partner in Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. asserted that: "If the independent accountant's re-
sponsibility for financial statements extended as far as some plaintiffs
in current litigation claim it does, independent public accountants could
no longer afford to practice their profession." "" Justice Cardozo's
expression of concern for limitless liabilities in Ultramares 55 has be-
come a rallying cry for those who argue for narrow interpretation of
the accountant's legal duties.
The legitimate fear of unlimited liability has little application to
situations where, as here, liability is confined to instances involving
conscious breach of a duty. Because the obligation turns on the
accountant's awareness of his error, the power to limit liability is in
his hands and, hence, the financial burden cast upon the accounting
profession is likely to be quite limited."
The possibility that this added burden will lead to financial ruin is
especially remote in light of the extensive development of professional
liability insurance in recent years.57 The American Institute of Certi-
54 Hanson, Responsibilies of Independent Public Accountants, 22 Bus. LAWYER
975 (1967).
55 See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
6 Although the growth of the large accounting firms has resulted in some loss
of control by the firm organizations over partner accountants, the firm nonetheless
still retains as much control over the work of individual partners as is present in the
normal corporate situation; this should be sufficient protection against excessive
liability. It is only proper that the firm should suffer for the lapses of its partners,
in much the same way any principal may suffer liability for the breaches of its agents.
5
7 See AmERIcAN INsTITUTE OF CERTImE PUBLIc ACCOUNTANTS, INSURANCE FOR
ACCOUNTING FIRms AND PRACITIONERS (Economics of Accounting Practice, Bull. 10,
1959).
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fled Public Accountants reports that sizeable policies are carried by
the vast majority of accounting firms.' It has been argued that an
expansion of liability will result in driving the cost of professional
insurance to the point where either the insurance will have to be
dropped or the auditors' fees greatly swollen by the costs of pro-
tection.59 The limited incidence of liability that can be expected to
result from recognition of accountants' duties to disclose discovery of
error likely would not lead to any substantial effects on the price of
either insurance or accounting services. However, to the extent that
any increase in auditing costs results, the enormous burden of damages
caused by the failure to correct the original statements will be spread
over the economy, and thus be more easily borne." One writer, in
considering the consequences of broadening accountants' liabilities,
reached the following conclusion:
The courts have been markedly solicitous for the accountant's
economic circumstances . . . [I]n light of the economic'
maturity of the independent accounting profession, further
dependence on judicial tenderness seems ill founded..
[I]n 1960, Fortune Mvagazine estimated that the top eight
public accounting firms employed about 15 per cent. of the
nation's approximately 77,000 Chartered Public Accountants.
Together, it was estimated, these accounting houses annually
grossed over $200,000,000. Furthermore, a typical firm
was thought to carry about $15,000,000 in insurance.
Maintenance of a sound economy through the building
and preservation of investor confidence in the securities
markets and corporate management is far more important
than the private need of the accounting profession to be free
of a threatened liability for fraud against which ample pro-
tection can be taken.
The legal duties of the auditor ought to be co-extensive
with his professional pretensions.6
Protection of the Accountant-Client Relationship
Because of the likely possibility that, as in Fischer, an accountant's
post-certification discovery of error will be made while the accountant
58Id. at 5.
59 It is likely that higher premiums would have the most devastating effect on
the small individual accountant who operates on a relatively small margin. This
pressure, in turn, may necessitate the amalgamation of these units into entities which
can more easily absorb this large added expense. See Editorial, The Specter of
Auditors' Liability, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1965, at 34.
1o Cf. C. MoRRs, TORTS 16-17, 246-55 (1953).
61 Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent'Audlit, 1966 J. Bus. LAW
190, 195-96.
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is doing internal work for the corporation (which, in itself, entails
none of the public responsibility involved in certification), the recog-
nition of a duty to disclose may be attacked as a violation of the con-
fidential relationship between accountant and client. Concern within
the profession for the protection of this relationship has grown as
reliance on accountants' services has increased. As a result, there has
been agitation in recent years for the recognition of an accountant-
client evidentiary privilege. 2
The policy of protecting confidential communications between ac-
countant and client, which is embodied in the growing list of statutes
recognizing the evidentiary privilege, will not be at all compromised
by liability for nondisclosure of post-certification discovery of error.
It is essential to remember that the purpose of a privilege for con-
fidential communications is to encourage the free exchange of informa-
tion necessary to a relationship which is deemed to have a great social
value. The scope of such a privilege is accordingly limited to serve
this function:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation be-
tween the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.63
These limitations provide the basis for the widely recognized privilege
for communications made in the course of seeking or receiving legal ad-
vice from a lawyer.8 ' The attorney-client privilege, on which the call for
an accountant-client privilege is largely based,"5 reflects a judgment that
an attorney's complete awareness of his client's position is essential in
performing his role of obtaining justice for that client. The social
value of such awareness is thought sufficient to justify recognition of
a communications privilege." In the accountant-client relationship,
it is difficult to perceive a similar value sufficient to justify protecting
the client's admission (or the accountant's discovery) of financial ir-
62 Fourteen states have enacted legislation extending some degree of protection to
the accountant-client relationship. See Katsoris, Confidential Communications-The
Accountants" Dilemma, 35 FoRDHAm L. REv. 51, 55-64 (1966).
038 j. WIGmoRE, EviDENcE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
64 Id. § 2292, at 554.
O65 See Katsoris, supra note 62, at 53-55.
66C. McCoarncz, EvIDENcE § 91, at 181 (1954).
19681
514 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
regularity. Since the accountant, unlike the attorney, serves the public
primarily as a reporter, rather than as an advocate, communications
which do not somehow enhance his ability to report accurately are of
questionable social value. To protect discovery of financial irregulari-
ties from public disclosure would be to void the primary benefit which
can be served by such a discovery.
While the protective policy of a communications privilege is in-
applicable to the present problem, it might be argued that the account-
ant's fear of ill-will from his client, resulting from the accountant's
disclosure of irregularities or errors to the proper authorities, would
serve to deter him from making such disclosures. In order to ease this
awkward situation, the accountant should be permitted to make the
initial disclosure of error directly to his client. If after being informed
of the discovery of mistakes, the client fails to disclose the information
promptly to the appropriate authorities, the accountant would be
obligated to do so himself, in order to avoid possible liability.67
Prevention of Overreaction by the Securities Markets
The discovery of error in already-released financial statements
raises the difficult question of how to correct the error quickly, without
inducing speculative overreaction in the market for the corporation's
securities. The danger is that disclosure of bad news about the
corporation will cause investors to panic, driving the price of the
stock down further than news of the error warrants. When the price
of the securities is far below their proper value, the effect is to deny
a market for their stock to those who already hold shares. The threat
of overreaction is especially severe in situations like that in Fischer,
where, although a mistake is recognized, the correct figures are not
yet known. Yet, the effect of withholding the news in order to
avoid market overreaction would be to invite further commitments of
money to the corporation based on faulty information. Although, in
transactions involving the transfer of securities before disclosure of
the error, there might be instances where the effect of the sale would
be to relieve the seller of overvalued stock bought and held on the
basis of the misinformation, securities sales by sellers who have not
relied on the misinformation would involve no such redeeming feature.
Moreover, failure to correct the statements may have effects beyond
the securities markets, allowing extensions of additional credit to the
corporation at a time when repayment is unlikely.
67A rule limiting the accountant's duty to disclosure to his client, and shifting
all responsibility for further disclosure to the informed client, might endanger the
important purposes behind the imposition of liability. It is quite possible that the
client will have no incentive for disclosure, either because the mistake was part of
an intentional scheme to defraud, in which case a new basis for liability would have
little deterrent effect, or because damages for nondisclosure will be uncollectible be-
cause of the client's financial condition. In the latter situation, which is certainly
possible in cases of erroneous financial statements, there would be no source of com-
pensation for those injured by the client's nondisclosure.
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The destablizing effects of news of the discovered errors may well
be minimized by resort to suspension of trading in the corporation's
securities. Such a step, which can be taken by either the stock
exchange on which the securities are traded '8 or the SEC,69 has been
utilized with increasing frequency in recent years.7' Trading has been
suspended most often in situations like that discussed here, where
information about the corporation was either unreliable or unavailable,
and the suspensions generally have extended until such time as an
accurate picture of the corporation's position could be presented."' It
should be noted that, despite increasing use of the suspension power,
the tendency has been away from suspension in cases where, even with
complete reporting of the company's condition, there is uncertainty
over its future prospects." Thus, a decision to suspend trading will
not involve a denial of an opportunity for stockholders to unload their
stock quickly at relatively high prices based on legitimate hopes for
the company's health, but rather will be confined to situations where
no such intelligent judgment to buy could be made. Further, it can
hardly be claimed that stock prices will always be lower after sus-
pension of trading than they would be immediately after disclosure of
the error, since the investigation of the corporation's finances pending
resumption of trading may well reveal smaller losses than those
6 8 E.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 499, CCH NYSE GuIDE 2499 (1967).
69 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1964).
70 No suspensions of trading were ordered in the years 1934-1943. The following
table, compiled after independent examination of the public releases, provides a break-
down of SEC suspensions by year:
1944 1 1956 2
1945 1 1957 2
1946 2 1958 2
1947 0 1959 3
1948 1 1960 1
1949 0 1961 4
1950 0 1962 6
1951 0 1963 2
1952 0 1964 1
1953 2 1965 11
1954 0 1966 14
1955 0 Sept. 1967 24
71 E.g., Northern Instrument Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos.
8061 (April 21, 1967) and 8142 (August 11, 1967) (SEC suspends over-the-counter
trading in corporation's securities after receiving letter from corporation stating that
former president of corporation caused the books to overstate assets); American
Plan Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 8091 (May 29, 1967) and
8097 (June 5, 1967) (SEC suspends over-the-counter trading after learning that com-
pany's figures, based on contractual commitments held at time statements were filed,
had become incorrect in light of failure of the other contracting party); Sports
Arenas, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 8005 (December 7, 1966)
and 8102 (June 13, 1967) (SEC suspends over-the-counter trading because of lack
of reliable information concerning the company's financial condition; annual financial
reports were submitted more than 6 months late, and were sufficiently confused as
to lead the auditors to refuse certification) ; Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1967, at 8,
col. 3 (American Stock Exchange orders trading halt in shares of Scurry-Rainbow
Oil Ltd. at the request of company, pending an important announcement concerning
discovery of Canadian oil reserves).
72 Compare cases cited in note 71 .rupra with those collected in 2 Loss 852-53.
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anticipated by the market. Although freezing holdings of the cor-
poration's stock by the suspension of trading would involve the serious
consequence of tying up the funds of stockholders, the avoidance of the
tremendous dangers of nondisclosure or destablizing speculation that
such action would achieve seems well worth this cost. In order to
allow for such suspension when appropriate, disclosure of error should
be made to the exchange on which the corporation's securities are
traded, or, in the case of over-the-counter issues, to the SEC.73
CONCLUSION
As the above discussion indicates, the decision to interpret the
common law of deceit or section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
as providing liability for an accountant's nondisclosure of his post-
certification discovery of error would entail certain costs to the
accounting profession, and to the investing public as a whole. The
liability would inevitably create some financial burden. Disclosure of
error in accordance with the duty suggested will have some disruptive
effects on securities markets. Some friction between the accountant
and his client will likely be created. But these costs are clearly out-
weighed by the financial burdens and disruptions of securities markets
that would result from the failure of the accountant to publicize his
findings of error in certified financial statements. These dangers to
the financial community are so great as to call for the recognition of
the suggested duty of disclosure.
73The considerations involved in deciding whether to suspend trading are different
if the discovery of error is accompanied by discovery of the correct figures. In such
a case, immediate release of the corrected statements would not create the void of
uncertainty suggested above. However, significant problems-prejudice to investors
with unequal access to the notice and overreaction in the form of panic selling-would
still remain. See generally S. ROBBINS, THFE SEcuRrrias MARKET (1966). The de-
cision of whether these factors are sufficient to require suspension of trading, despite
the burdens that such action places on the securities markets as well as the sus-
pending agency, is one which should be made by the agency itself. Therefore, even
when the accountant is able to provide figures to replace the previously certified
misstatement, disclosure should be made to the exchange or the SEC before further
publication.
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